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Sensory attenuationa b s t r a c t
The sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over one’s actions, and, through them, over external
events. One proposed marker of implicit sense of agency is ‘intentional binding’—the tendency to per-
ceive voluntary actions and their outcomes as close in time. Another is attenuation of the sensory conse-
quences of a voluntary action. Here we show that the ability to choose an outcome through action
selection contributes to implicit sense of agency. We measured intentional binding and stimulus inten-
sity ratings using painful and non-painful somatosensory outcomes. In one condition, participants chose
between two actions with different probabilities of producing high or low intensity outcomes, so action
choices were meaningful. In another condition, action selection was meaningless with respect to the out-
come. Having control over the outcome increased binding, especially when outcomes were painful.
Greater sensory attenuation also tended to be associated with stronger binding of the outcome towards
the action that produced it. Previous studies have emphasised the link between sense of agency and ini-
tiation of voluntary motor actions. Our study shows that the ability to control outcomes by discriminative
action selection is another key element of implicit sense of agency. It also investigates, for the first time,
the relation between binding and sensory attenuation for the same events.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling one’s
own actions and, through them, events in the outside world. It is
a ubiquitous and familiar experience, but has proved difficult to
study experimentally, in part because of a ‘self-serving bias’ that
associates more positive outcomes to one’s own agency (Bradley,
1978; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Burling, & Tibbs, 1992). Implicit
measures of sense of agency may address these issues. The ‘inten-
tional binding’ measure involves a compression of the perceived
interval between voluntary actions and their outcomes, relative
to passive movements and their outcomes (Haggard & Clark,
2003; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Attenuation of the sen-
sory consequences of a voluntary action has also been proposed
as a measure of implicit sense of agency (Blakemore, Frith, &
Wolpert, 1999). However, it remains unclear whether both mea-
sures reflect a single underlying cognitive construct, or distinct
cognitive processes. Dewey and Knoblich (2014) found no
association between them across participants, but the two
measures were obtained from separate tasks. The relation betweensensory attenuation and intentional binding might become clearer
if both measures are obtained for the same action-outcome events.
Another key aspect of the concept of agency, besides motoric
action control, is the ability to influence events in the world. How-
ever, it is not yet known whether the implicit sense of agency is
sensitive to the degree of control one has over the outcomes of
one’s actions. Intentional binding studies generally pair one or
more possible actions with a single outcome. One showed stronger
binding when an action was more likely to produce an outcome
(Moore & Haggard, 2008). Another found that intentional binding
increased with the number of alternative actions producing the
same outcome (Barlas & Obhi, 2013). In everyday life, however,
people choose between alternative actions based on their antici-
pated consequences. Accordingly, Desantis, Hughes, and Waszak
(2012) asked participants to press one of two keys, producing
either a high or a low tone. They found no difference in binding
between a condition where the key predicted the pitch of the tone,
and a condition where the pitch was unpredictable. This suggests
that intentional binding is insensitive to control over which
outcome is produced. Yet, no study has investigated intentional
binding in the everyday situation of choosing between alternative
actions based on the value of their likely outcomes. Here we
investigated whether implicit sense of agency reflects the degree
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agent.
One such meaningful outcome is pain. Some have reported a
reduction in intentional binding with negative action outcomes
(Christensen, Yoshie, Di Costa, & Haggard, 2016; Takahata et al.,
2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). On the other hand, pain is a pow-
erful learning signal, guiding future action to avoid injury and fur-
ther pain. The importance of associating one’s actions with harmful
consequences might suggest an increased sense of agency for
actions with painful outcomes, as long as one can minimise pain
level through action selection. Thus, control over pain level should
increase binding. Such a finding would demonstrate that the impli-
cit sense of agency reflects three components of volition: the
capacity to choose between alternative actions, sensitivity to their
consequences, and the motivational value of those consequences.
In this study, we used intentional binding and stimulus inten-
sity ratings to investigate implicit sense of agency for painful out-
comes. Participants selected between two alternative actions. For
half the participants, the outcome of their action was either a high
intensity or a low intensity heat-pain stimulus. For the other half,
the outcome was either a high intensity or a low intensity electro-
cutaneous stimulus, which was never perceived as painful. In both
groups, we compared blocks where participants could control
outcome intensity through their action selection with blocks
where they could not. Participants reported either the time of their
action or the time of the outcome (Fig. 1). We predicted greaterFig. 1. Trial timelines for baseline action judgement blocks, baseline outcointentional binding (i.e. stronger implicit sense of agency) when
participants could learn to minimise pain by selecting the appro-
priate action. We also asked our participants to rate outcome stim-
ulus intensity after each trial. Since both sensory attenuation and
intentional binding have been proposed as implicit measures of
sense of agency, we investigated whether lower intensity ratings
(i.e. sensory attenuation) would be associated with greater inten-
tional binding across trials.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Fifty healthy adults participated. Half had painful heat stimuli
as outcomes (17 female, 18–35 years old, Mage = 25.28 years,
SDage = ±4.86 years). The other half had non-painful electro-
cutaneous stimuli as outcomes (16 female, 19–39 years old,
Mage = 26.56 years, SDage = ±4.93 years). All gave written informed
consent, and were paid £7.50/hr. The experiment was approved
by the UCL Research Ethics Committee, and carried out in accor-
dance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Apparatus and materials
A computer running Labview 2012 (National Instruments,
Austin, TX, USA) displayed the clock, triggered the stimuli, andme judgement blocks, and operant action/outcome judgement blocks.
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hand dorsum with a CO2 laser stimulation device (SIFEC, Ferrières,
Belgium). Each laser stimulus lasted 100 ms, including tempera-
ture ramp-up and plateau. Electro-cutaneous stimuli, lasting
5 ms, were delivered with a DS5 constant current stimulator (Dig-
itimer, Welwyn Garden City, UK) connected to self-adhesive stim-
ulation electrodes (BIOPAC, Goleta, CA, USA) affixed to the left
hand dorsum.2.3. Procedure
In the heat-pain group, each participant’s nociceptive threshold
was determined using a reaction time (RT) staircase. Participants
pressed a key with their right hand as soon as they detected any
sensation on their left hand. Starting at 38 C, laser temperature
increased by 4 C until RT fell below 650 ms, then decreased by
2 C until RT rose above 650 ms, and finally increased by 1 C until
RT was below 650 ms on 3 out of 4 repetitions. The final tempera-
ture was taken as the threshold. The 650-ms cutoff provides a valid
measure of Ad activation (Churyukanov, Plaghki, Legrain, &
Mouraux, 2012; Mouraux, Guérit, & Plaghki, 2003). Low heat-
pain stimuli were set to 2 C above threshold (Mthr = 48.68 C,
SDthr = ±1.38 C), and high heat-pain stimuli were set to 8 C above
threshold.
In the electro-cutaneous group, each participant’s tactile detec-
tion threshold was determined using a yes/no staircase. Starting at
0.4 mA, the intensity increased by 0.4 mA until it was detected,
then decreased by 0.2 mA until it was no longer detected, and
finally increased by 0.1 mA until it was detected on 3 out of 4 rep-
etitions. To match the substantial variability in the perceived
intensity of a nociceptive heat stimulus (e.g. Kong et al., 2006;
Kupers, Faymonville, & Laureys, 2005), low and high ranges of
electro-cutaneous stimulation were used rather than two fixed
intensities. The low stimulus ranged from 0.75 to 1.25 mA above
detection threshold (Mthr = 0.58 mA, SDthr = ±0.20 mA). The high
intensity stimulus ranged from 2.75 to 3.25 mA above threshold.
All participants reported that the electro-cutaneous stimuli were
not painful.Fig. 2. Schematic representationThe low and high stimuli were each demonstrated twice. Partic-
ipants then completed six practice trials in which they rated stim-
ulus intensity on a visual analogue scale (VAS) from 0 to 100. To
anchor use of the scale, they were instructed to consider the aver-
age perceived intensity of the low stimulus demonstrations a ‘25’,
and the average perceived intensity of the high stimulus demon-
strations a ‘75’.
Next, participants completed the main experiment, consisting
of 2 baseline action judgement blocks, 4 baseline outcome judge-
ment blocks, 4 operant action judgement blocks, and 4 operant
outcome judgement blocks (Fig. 2). Half the participants completed
the baseline blocks first, and the other half completed the operant
blocks first. Within the baseline and operant conditions, block
order was ABBA counterbalanced. Each block contained 10 trials.
2.3.1. Baseline action judgements
Participants fixated a rotating clock marked from 0 to 60 in
increments of 5. At a time of their own free choice, they pressed
a key with their right hand. They were told that they could press
either F3 or F4, but to use both keys. Participants were instructed
not to choose a time to press the key in advance. The clock stopped
1500–2500 ms after the key press. Participants reported where the
clock hand was when they pressed the key, being as precise as
possible.
2.3.2. Baseline outcome judgements
Participants fixated the same clock, but did not make an action.
After a random delay, one of two green lights on either side of the
clock flashed. After 250 ms, a high or low heat-pain or electro-
cutaneous stimulus was delivered to their left hand. Participants
reported where the clock hand was when they felt the stimulus,
and then used the VAS to rate stimulus intensity.
In two of the blocks, one of the lights preceded a low intensity
stimulus 70% of the time. The other light preceded a low intensity
stimulus 30% of the time. Before these blocks, the participant was
told that one of the lights would be more likely to precede a low
intensity stimulus, and they should report which light it was at
the end of the block. The position of this light varied randomly
between blocks.of the experimental design.
Table 1
Summary of fixed effects in linear mixed effects model of action binding.
Fixed effect Coefficient (ms)a DF t p
Mean SEM
Outcome modality (heat-pain vs electro-cutaneous) 17.90 ±19.72 48 0.91 0.369
Outcome control (probabilistic vs no control) 28.67 ±9.11 1931 3.15 0.002
Intensity rating 0.32 ±0.33 1931 0.98 0.329
Outcome modality  Outcome control 3.31 ±12.84 1931 0.26 0.797
Outcome modality  Intensity rating 0.07 ±0.43 1931 0.16 0.873
Outcome control  Intensity rating 0.69 ±0.42 1931 1.65 0.099
Outcome modality  Outcome control  Intensity rating 0.72 ±0.56 1931 1.28 0.202
a Positive coefficients indicate greater action binding.
B. Beck et al. / Cognition 162 (2017) 54–60 57In the other two blocks, both lights preceded a low intensity
stimulus 60% of the time. Before these blocks, participants were
told that the light that flashed would have nothing to do with
the intensity of the stimulus they would receive.2.3.3. Operant action judgements
Participants pressed either F3 or F4 with their right hand at a
time of their own free choice, and, 250 ms later, a high or low
heat-pain or electro-cutaneous stimulus was delivered to their left
hand. Participants reported where the clock hand was when they
pressed the key, and then rated stimulus intensity on the VAS.
In the two ‘probabilistic control’ blocks, one of the keys
produced a low intensity stimulus 70% of the time. The other key
produced a low intensity stimulus 30% of the time. Before these
blocks, the participant was told that pressing one of the keys would
be more likely to give them a low intensity stimulus, and they
should report which key it was at the end of the block. The identity
of this key varied randomly between blocks.
In the two ‘no control’ blocks, both keys produced a low
intensity stimulus 60% of the time. This probability was chosen
to balance the number of high and low intensity outcomes in the
‘probabilistic control’ and ‘no control’ blocks, assuming that partic-
ipants would try to avoid high intensity outcomes when possible.
Before the ‘no control’ blocks, participants were told that the key
they pressed would have nothing to do with the stimulus intensity
they would receive.2.3.4. Operant outcome judgements
These blocks were the same as the operant action judgment
blocks, except that participants reported where the clock hand
was when they felt the stimulus.3. Results
3.1. Action binding
Action binding is the difference in the perceived time of the
action when it is followed by an outcome (operant action judge-
ment condition), compared to when it is not (baseline action
judgement condition; Table S1). A linear mixed effects model with
random intercepts by participant was used to find predictors of
action binding across trials. The fixed effects were outcome modal-
ity (painful heat or innocuous electro-cutaneous stimuli), outcome
control (probabilistic control or no control), subjective intensity
rating (mean-centred), and their 2- and 3-way interaction terms.
Wald tests of the marginal significance of each predictor showed
that outcome control was the only significant predictor of action
binding, t(1931) = 3.15, p = 0.002 (b = 28.67 ms, SE = ±9.11 ms;
Table 1). There was greater action binding when participants had
probabilistic control over stimulus intensity than when they had
no control (Fig. 3a).3.2. Outcome binding
Outcome binding is the difference in the perceived time of the
outcome when it is caused by the participant’s action (operant out-
come judgement condition), compared to when it is not (baseline
outcome judgement condition; Table S2). A linear mixed effects
model was used to find predictors of outcome binding across trials.
Wald tests showed that the interaction between outcome control
and outcomemodality was a significant predictor of outcome bind-
ing, t(1931) = 2.68, p = 0.008 (b = 44.64 ms, SE = ±16.66 ms).
There was also a non-significant trend towards lower stimulus
intensity ratings predicting greater outcome binding (i.e. a more
negative binding value), t(1931) = 1.82, p = 0.069 (b = 0.77 ms,
SE = ±0.42 ms; Table 2).
To follow up the interaction, we ran separate mixed effects
models for the groups that received heat-pain and electro-
cutaneous stimulation. Probabilistic control over heat-pain level
predicted greater outcome binding, t(964) = 4.93, p < 0.0001
(b = 60.40, SE = ±12.25). Control over electro-cutaneous intensity
did not predict outcome binding, t(971) = 1.08, p = 0.282
(b = 11.70, SE = ±10.86) (see Fig. 3b).
We also ran a linear mixed effects model of timing judgement
errors in the baseline outcome judgement blocks alone, to deter-
mine whether the effect of outcome control might have come from
differences between conditions in the baseline blocks. In baseline
blocks the outcome stimulus was not controlled, but was pre-
dictable to the same extent as in the corresponding operant blocks,
because visual cues preceded the stimuli. Outcome predictability
did not predict baseline outcome judgement errors (Table S3).3.3. Intensity ratings
Intensity ratings were submitted to an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the between-subjects factor ‘outcome modality’
(painful heat or innocuous electro-cutaneous stimuli) and the
within-subjects factors ‘outcome intensity’ (high or low), ‘block
type’ (baseline outcome judgements, operant outcome judge-
ments, or operant action judgements), and ‘outcome predictability’
(probabilistic or unpredictable). There were main effects of out-
come intensity, F(1,48) = 455.63, p = <0.00001,gp2 = 0.905, and out-
come modality, F(1,48) = 10.98, p = 0.002, gp2 = 0.186. Participants
perceived the high intensity stimuli (M = 55.35, SEM = ±1.96) as
stronger than the low intensity stimuli (M = 24.62, SEM = ±1.24),
and the heat-pain stimuli (M = 44.42, SEM = ±1.44) as more intense
than the electro-cutaneous stimuli (M = 35.55, SEM = ±2.26).
Additionally, there was a main effect of outcome predictability,
F(1,48) = 5.74, p = 0.020, gp2 = 0.107, a two-way interaction
between outcome intensity and predictability, F(1,48) = 6.06,
p = 0.017, gp2 = 0.112, and a three-way interaction between out-
come intensity, predictability, and modality, F(1,48) = 20.35,
p = 0.00004, gp2 = 0.298. Paired samples t-tests with a Bonferroni
correction (aadj=0.05/[8(8  1)/2] = 0.002) showed that high heat-
Table 2
Summary of fixed effects in linear mixed effects model of outcome binding.
Fixed effect Coefficient (ms)a DF t p
Mean SEM
Outcome modality (heat-pain vs electro-cutaneous) 8.67 ±39.13 48 0.22 0.826
Outcome control (probabilistic vs no control) 13.96 ±11.79 1931 1.18 0.236
Intensity rating 0.77 ±0.42 1931 1.82 0.069
Outcome modality  Outcome control 44.64 ±16.66 1931 2.68 0.008
Outcome modality  Intensity rating 0.22 ±0.54 1931 0.41 0.683
Outcome control  Intensity rating 0.29 ±0.54 1931 0.54 0.588
Outcome modality  Outcome control  Intensity rating 0.19 ±0.73 1931 0.27 0.790
a Negative coefficients indicate greater outcome binding.
Fig. 3. Mean (±SEM) intentional binding values in each experimental condition, shown separately for (a) action binding, and (b) outcome binding. For visual simplicity, actual
stimulus intensities (high or low) are shown here, but participants’ subjective intensity ratings were used in the mixed effects models of action and outcome binding.
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predictable (M = 58.66, SEM = ±1.67) than when they were unpre-
dictable (M = 63.04, SEM = ±2.04), t(24) = 5.06, p = 0.000036
(Fig. 4a). Perception of low heat-pain stimuli did not vary with
predictability, t(24) = 0.90, p = 0.377, nor did perception of
electro-cutaneous stimuli (Fig. 4b), whether high, t(24) = 0.02,
p = 0.988, or low, t(24) = 2.06, p = 0.050.4. Discussion
We found that both action and outcome binding increased
when participants had probabilistic control over outcome inten-
sity. This shows that intentional binding reflects the degree of con-
trol over the consequences of one’s actions. Because our measureswere implicit, we know that the underlying experience of action
was changed, rather than the evaluation of that experience.
Having control over outcomes only enhanced outcome binding
when the outcomes were painful. The capacity for pain to motivate
action is acknowledged by recent theories (Haggard, Iannetti, &
Longo, 2013; Legrain, Iannetti, Plaghki, & Mouraux, 2011), and dis-
tinct from evoked withdrawal responses. Our finding indicates the
sense of control over pain may reflect a basic form of adaptive
behaviour.
Action and outcome binding may reflect qualitatively different
processes, or just two measures of a common process related to
the sense of agency. We found that the motivational value of the
outcome influenced outcome binding, but not action binding. This
may demonstrate an important difference between action and
Fig. 4. Mean (±SEM) stimulus intensity ratings in each experimental condition for (a) painful radiant heat stimuli, and (b) non-painful electro-cutaneous stimuli.
**** = p < 0.0001.
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tingency, while the latter is sensitive to outcome valence.
In both baseline and operant blocks, predictable high heat-pain
stimuli were perceived as less intense than unpredictable high
heat-pain stimuli. Self-administration of painful stimuli is known
to reduce perceived pain intensity relative to external administra-
tion (Kakigi & Shibasaki, 1992; Müller, 2012; Wang, Wang, & Luo,
2011). Our findings suggest that self-administration attenuates
pain primarily because the action predicts the likely pain level.
This is compatible with studies showing that painful stimuli feel
less intense when they are cued than when they are unexpected
(Carlsson et al., 2006; Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1994).
We also found a non-significant trend towards lower stimulus
intensity ratings predicting greater outcome binding. Our findingsuggests that sensory attenuation and outcome binding (but per-
haps not action binding) may track a common underlying process
related to sense of agency. However, this assertion should be trea-
ted with caution, for two reasons. First, the relation between these
measures only approached the conventional boundary of statistical
significance. Second, the association could reflect a domain-general
mechanism of multisensory integration, in which the perception of
action and outcome are combined in a way that is weighted by the
reliability or the salience of each (Ernst & Banks, 2002). Future
studies might further investigate whether this modest relation
between perceived stimulus intensity and intentional binding is
based on domain-general mechanisms such as multisensory cue
integration, or an agency-specific process that has common effects
on both intensity perception and time perception.
60 B. Beck et al. / Cognition 162 (2017) 54–605. Conclusions
Our study shows that intentional binding is sensitive to the con-
tingency structure of the environment, represented in our design
by the contrast between blocks where participants had probabilis-
tic control over outcome intensity and blocks where they had no
such control. Moreover, the effect of control on outcome binding
is modulated by the motivational significance of the action out-
comes, represented by the contrast between painful and non-
painful stimuli. Therefore, the implicit sense of agency, as mea-
sured by intentional binding, reflects the ability to choose between
actions with different foreseeable and valenced consequences, pro-
viding a key link between volition, motivation, and responsibility.
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